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Abstract
In addressing the problem of the (in)compatibility of divine fore-
knowledge and human freedom, philosophers of religion encounter prob-
lems regarding the metaphysics and structure of time. Some models
of temporal logic developed for completely independent reasons have
proved especially appropriate for representing the temporal structure
of the world as Molinism conceives it. In particular, some models of the
Thin Red Line (TRL) seem to imply that conditionals of freedom are
true or false, as Molinists maintain. Noting the resemblance between
Molinism and TRL models, Restall (2011) has advanced some criti-
cisms of Molinism that have also been leveled against TRL models. In
particular, Restall believes that the implication p → HFp is not true
in TRL models. Because Molinists must also accept that this implica-
tion is not true, this is a problem for them. We will show that Restall’s
criticism is wide of the mark. Firstly, it will be demonstrated that in
many open future models (not just TRL) the implication p→ HFp is
invalid. Secondly, while it is possible to account for this implication,
some modifications are required in respect of the branching time se-
mantics. In proposing one such modification, we show that this new
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semantics can be adopted by advocates of the TRL and, as a conse-
quence, by Molinists as well. We conclude that the principle stated
by Restall is either a problem for many open future models (not just
for Molinists) or can be accounted for by these models and so is not a
problem for Molinists either.
In addressing the centuries-old problem of the (in)compatibility of di-
vine foreknowledge and human freedom, philosophers of religion encounter
problems regarding the metaphysics and structure of time. As divine fore-
knowledge concerns past knowledge of what will happen in the future, this
connection is entirely natural. As we will see, some models of temporal
logic developed for completely independent reasons have proved especially
appropriate for representing the temporal structure of the world as Molinism
conceives it. In particular, some models of the Thin Red Line (TRL), accord-
ing to which there is a true future among the possible futures, seem to imply
that some conditionals of freedom, such as “if the agent a were in conditions
C, she would freely choose to do ϕ”, are true or false, as Molinists maintain.
Noting the resemblance between Molinism and TRL models, Restall (2011)
has advanced some criticisms of Molinism that have also been leveled against
TRL models. In particular, Restall believes that the implication between p
and “it has always been true in the past that in the future p” is not true
in TRL models. Because Molinists must also accept that this implication is
not true, Restall maintains that this is a problem for Molinists, given the
plausibility of this implication. The present aim is to show that Restall’s
criticism is wide of the mark. It will be demonstrated that many open future
models (not just TRL) run into the problematic implication between p and
“it has always been true in the past that in the future p”. While it is possible
to account for this implication, some modifications are required in respect of
the branching time semantics. In proposing one such modification, we do not
contend that this is the only possibility, but we show that this new semantics
can be adopted by advocates of the TRL and, as a consequence, by Molinists
as well. We conclude that the principle stated by Restall is either a problem
for many open future models (not just for Molinists) or can be accounted for
by these models and so is not a problem for Molinists either.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Sections 1 and 2 compare the
indeterminist Aristotelian model and the TRL model. In section 3, the TRL
model is shown to be especially apposite for Molinism. Restall’s argument is
presented in section 4, and in section 5, the problem advanced by Restall is
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shown to be common to other open future models, including the Aristotelian
model. In section 6, a semantics is proposed that can solve Restall’s prob-
lem, which can be implemented by both Aristotelian indeterminists and TRL
theorists and, therefore, by Molinists as well. Conclusions are presented in
section 7.
1 Models of the Future
There is broad consensus that propositions regarding the past can be true
or false. However, propositions concerning future contingents continue to
provoke discussion. One possibility is the determinist1 conception, according
to which the future is determined by the past. In this case, propositions
concerning the future are true or false, as are those concerning the past,
because what will happen tomorrow is already determined today. Suppose,
however, that the world is indeterministic, and that the future, unlike the
past, is open. This means that many future histories are possible, and that
the past does not determine what will happen. Which truth value should
we then assign to propositions concerning the future in an indeterminist
framework? There are at least two possible positions; either propositions
concerning the future are untrue (the Aristotelian solution)2 or they can be
true (the Thin Red Line solution).
The Aristotelian position3 is grounded on the intuition that no future his-
1Sometimes, the term “fatalism” is used in this context, invoking a distinction between
logical and theological fatalism. We favor the term “determinism” because there is at least
a sense in which fatalism is not equivalent to the idea that there is a unique future history.
On this view, a certain state of the world is destined to occur, regardless of any choices
made by agents. This implies a certain form of determinism (in that a certain fate is
decided), but this does not impede the existence of alternatives – that is, of different
possibilities that lead to the same final outcome. To formally capture this idea of fatalism,
it is necessary to assume that the past is branching – in other words, that many histories
can converge on a single instant.
2Under the label “Aristotelism” we collect the positions according to which propositions
regarding future contingents cannot be true. By "untrue" we mean that these propositions
can be considered either false (Peircean semantics, cf. Prior 1967: 128-9 and, more recently,
Todd 2016)) or neither true nor false (supervalutionism, cf. Thomason 1970, 1984). For
present purposes, these two alternatives can be treated on par because both suppose that
there is no true future history that is privileged over the others.
3We will use the term “Aristotelian” without adopting any stance about the historical
question of Aristotle’s actual theory (on this issue, see Crivelli 2004: 198—226)
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tory is privileged over any other because the past does not establish which
will ensue. If a proposition is true in some possible futures and false in others,
it seems we cannot say what will happen in the future tout court. Thus, an
indeterminist and open conception of the future seems to imply that propo-
sitions concerning the future cannot be true. However, many scholars have
claimed that the truth of propositions about the future is not incompati-
ble with indeterminism and libertarian freedom.4 A common motto among
these scholars is that the future is “determinate but not determined.” The
basic idea is as follows. Suppose that Ann is a libertarian5 agent, and that
the actual situation in the world does not determine whether or not Ann
will drink a beer tomorrow. Tomorrow, however, Ann will have to choose
whether to drink a beer, and her choice will eliminate the other alternative.
Suppose that the truth of the proposition “Ann will drink a beer tomorrow”,
when evaluated at the present time, depends on the choice Ann makes to-
morrow. If Ann chooses to drink a beer tomorrow, the proposition is true
at the present time; if Ann chooses otherwise, the proposition is false. Obvi-
ously, Ann’s choice is epistemologically inaccessible today, but this does not
preclude that Ann will choose in a certain way tomorrow. If the truth of
the proposition at the present time depends on Ann’s future choice then the
proposition “Ann will drink a beer tomorrow” has a truth value, even though
we do not know which one. We can preserve bivalence even in a libertarian
and indeterminist framework, in which the present does not determine which
among the possible future histories will become true.
If a future history is to become true, it is privileged, on the basis that
this history will become true while the others will be pruned. In other words,
the future history that occurs is the actual future history; the others are just
possible futures that will not become real. The existence of a true future
history is not at odds with indeterminism because it is precisely the fact
that the agent will freely choose in a certain way that privileges that history
over the others. This privileged history is usually called the Thin Red Line
(TRL)6 to distinguish it metaphorically from other histories.
From here, we will ignore the determinist model, according to which there
4This thesis has been proposed by many different scholars in different contexts; see for
instance Barnes & Cameron (2009), Merricks (2009), Øhrstrøm (2009), Malpass & Wawer
(2012) Rosenkranz (2012), Borghini & Torrengo (2013), Wawer (2014).
5A libertarian agent is an agent that can perform (at least) a free action in the following
sense: the agent determines the action and the agent could do otherwise.
6The expression “Thin Red Line” was introduced by Belnap & Green (1994).
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is only one possible future history; we will instead compare the two indeter-
minist models outlined above: the Aristotelian model, according to which
there are several possible future histories, none of which is privileged over
the others; and the TRL model, according to which there is a true future
history that is privileged over the others. The next section elaborates a
formal treatment of these two models.
2 The two indeterminist models compared
To begin, some basic notions of temporal logic will be introduced to charac-
terize the two positions in question.7 A branching time structure (BT) is a
couple B = 〈T,<〉, where T is a non-empty set of instants and < is a rela-
tion defined on T . Intuitively, the instants are possible instantaneous states
of the world and < is the relation of temporal precedence. This relation is
therefore asymmetric and transitive and satisfies (at least) the conditions of
Backward Linearity (BL) and Historical Connectedness (HC):
(BL) ∀t, t1, t2(t1 < t ∧ t2 < t)⇒ (t1 = t2 ∨ t1 < t2 ∨ t2 < t1)
In words, two instants of the past of t are either identical or ordered by <;
this implies that, for every instant t, there is one and only one past history.
(HC) ∀t1∀t2∃t(t ≤ t1 ∧ t ≤ t2)
HC asserts that all the instants are connected in the past; the maximal
subsets of instants linearly ordered in T are referred to as histories – the
possible courses of events in the world. Ours is a propositional language
that includes a possible infinite set of propositional variables (V ar) and two
temporal operators P and F. We can define an evaluation function V :
V ar 7−→ ℘(T ) that maps every propositional letter p onto a set of instants
at which p is true. A model BT is, then, a couple 〈B, V 〉. According to
the indeterminist intuition, there is only one past history but many possible
future histories. We can represent this situation as follows.
Let us suppose to evaluate the propositions in the schema with respect
to the instant t0. While the two future histories h1 and h2 differ only from t0
7See, for instance, Burgess (1979); Thomason (1984); Øhrstrøm (1981, 2009); Belnap
et al. (2001), Hasle and Øhrstrøm (2005).
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Figure 1:
onward, they share all the states of affairs at instants prior to t0. In h1 at the
moment t1, the proposition p is true; in h2 at the moment t2, the proposition
¬p is true. The problem is how to evaluate the proposition Fp – that is, in
the future, p – with respect to t0. Indeed, while there is a state of affairs in
h1 that makes p true, there is no such state of affairs in h2.
One possibility would be to evaluate the proposition not only with respect
to a time but also with respect to a history (Ockhamist semantics):
M, t/h  p ⇔ t ∈ V (p)
M, t/h  ¬ϕ ⇔ M, t/h 2 ϕ
M, t/h  ϕ ∧ ψ ⇔ M, t/h  ϕ and M, t/h  ψ
M, t/h  Pϕ ⇔ ∃t′(t′ < t ∧M, t′/h  ϕ
M, t/h  Fϕ ⇔ ∃t′(t′ > t ∧ t′ ∈ h ∧M, t′/h  ϕ)
In such a case, Fp will be true at t0/h1 because there is a subsequent
instant in h1 at which p is true. However, it is false at t0/h2 because there is
no instant in h2 subsequent to t0 at which p is true:
M, t0/h1  Fp and M, t0/h2  F¬p
However, relativizing the evaluation in terms of histories does not address
the problem of the truth of propositions about the future tout court. Consider
a contingent proposition p, such as “Ann drinks a beer.” It is intuitively
possible that Ann will or will not drink a beer. When it is asked whether
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or not Ann will drink a beer (i.e., whether Fp), an answer that relativizes
the truth of Fp to histories is not entirely satisfactory. Indeed, a reply such
as “There is a history in which Ann drinks a beer, and there is a history in
which she does not drink a beer” does not seem helpful; we would like to
know what Ann will decide tout court, not with respect to a history.
So, when p is true in some future histories and false in other histories,
which is the truth value of the proposition Fp with respect to the moment
t0? As noted above, there are two possible alternatives. The first of these is
that this proposition is untrue;8 in this framework, the clause of the future
is
M, t  Fp ⇔ ∀h∃t′(t′ > t ∧ t′ ∈ h ∧M, t′/h  p)
If p is not true in all histories radiating from t0, then at least two options
are possible. On the first option, Fp is false (Peircean model). In this case, all
propositions concerning future contingents are false. On the second option,
Fp is false if in all histories radiating from t0 p is false and neither true nor
false if there is at least one history in which p is true and at least one history
in which ¬p is true (supervalutationism).
The TRL model is different; it assumes that the future is branching, as
in the Aristotelian model, but presupposes that one of these histories has a
privileged status with respect to the others. In other words, it is the history of
the world that will come true. A TRL structure is a couple T =< B,TRL >,
where B is a branching structure and TRL is a privileged history:
M, t TRL p ⇔ t ∈ V (p)
M, t TRL ¬ϕ ⇔ M, t 2TRL ϕ
M, t TRL ϕ ∧ ψ ⇔ M, t TRL ϕ and M, t TRL ψ
M, t TRL Pϕ ⇔ ∃t′(t′ < t ∧M, t′ TRL ϕ)
M, t TRL Fϕ ⇔ ∃t′(t′ > t ∧ t′ ∈ TRL ∧M, t′ TRL ϕ)
The relevant clause is the one concerning the future: Fϕ is true if there is
a time in the privileged future history at which ϕ is true. Notice that, in this
8Recall that by "untrue" we mean either false or neither true nor false. As Todd
(2016) points out, there are some analogies between the positions according to which
the propositions concerning the future lack a truth value or are false and the respective
positions of Strawson and Russell regarding which truth value, if any, to assign to a
proposition such as “The actual king of France is bald”, expressed at a time when France
is a republic. However, Schoubye and Rabern (2017) show that the standard arguments
for Russell’s treatment of definite descriptions fail to apply to the treatment of the future
operator.
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version of the TRL model, the Thin Red Line is a constituent of the structure
and not of the valuation; it is the world that has a unique privileged history.
In this schema, the history h1 is marked in red because it is the history
that the agent will make actual by choosing p. Of course, the agent could
have chosen otherwise, but she will not.
We will not discuss which of these two models best accounts for the idea
of an open future. One of the objections leveled against the TRL model is
that it does not take the openness of the future sufficiently seriously and
that it is a disguised form of determinism (cf. Belnap & Green 1994,
McFarlane 2003). If what an agent will do is already determinate, she cannot
really do otherwise; possible futures that differ from the TRL would not
really be open to the agent. Advocates of the TRL reply that choosing one
alternative does not mean that the agent could not have chosen another. If
it is only contingently true that the agent will choose an alternative over
the others, there is no necessity, and the openness of the future is preserved
(cf. Øhrstrøm 2009, Rosenkranz 2012). We will not take a side in this
debate because our interest lies elsewhere: to show that some TRL models
are compatible with Molinism and to evaluate some objections that have
been advanced against these models.9
9The TRL model presented here suffices for theological Ockhamism (see for instance
Plantinga 1986). Theological Ockhamists are committed to the claim that God believed
yesterday that a certain agent a will do ϕ tomorrow. Since God’s beliefs are infallible,
it follows that it is true today that agent a will do ϕ tomorrow, even though a, being
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3 The TRL+ Model
Suppose that Mary has invited Ann to a party. Ann must decide whether
to accept the invitation or to stay home to read a novel. Suppose that Ann
decides to dedicate herself to reading in the TRL. What would Ann have
done if she had gone to the party? She would have had to decide whether to
drink a beer or not. What would she have decided to do? The situation is
as follows.
The moment t0 is the moment at which Ann decides to stay at home to
read a novel (q) or to go to the party (¬q). As Ann will choose to read a
free, could have done otherwise. Therefore, although many different alternatives are open
to a, one of these is privileged because it is the alternative that a will choose, and this
is guaranteed by divine foreknowledge. One might believe that every account of divine
foreknowledge must accept a TRL model; indeed, if God is prescient and infallible, He
already knows what agents will do in the future. Therefore, it must already be true that
they will decide in certain ways rather than others. This seems to commit us to a TRL
model. However, this is not a necessary consequence if a timeless solution to the problem
of divine foreknowledge and human freedom is accepted. In the timeless model, God
is out of time, and it is therefore unnecessary to claim that God knew yesterday what
agents would do tomorrow. This timeless solution is demonstrably compatible with the
Aristotelian model of contingent futures (cf. Authors, 20XX). In the next section, we will
show that Molinists require a more demanding framework than the TRL model presented
here. This more demanding framework will be referred to as TRL+.
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novel, the history h1 is marked. However, if Ann had gone to the party, she
would have had to decide whether to drink a beer (p) or not (¬p)—that is,
to make h3 or h2 true. What would she have done in such a circumstance?
According to Belnap and Green (1994), the TRL theory should not only
account for sentences such as
1. Ann will read a novel and she will not go to the party
but also for sentences such as
2. Ann will read a novel and she will not go to the party but, if she had
gone to the party, she would have drunk a beer.10
In other words, for every bifurcation of the tree, whether in the actual his-
tory of the world or not, it is necessary to assign a truth value to the propo-
sition that describes what an agent will do in that circumstance. Among
advocates of TRL, one of the main aims is to preserve bivalence. However,
bivalence must be preserved not only for sentences such as (1) but also for
sentences such as (2).
Øhrstrøm (2009) has advanced a model that solves this problem.11 In a
nutshell, Øhrstrøm’s idea is not to consider the TRL semantically as a history
of the world but as a function (indicated here in lower case, trl) that takes
times and yields histories. In other words, for every bifurcation, trl defines
the TRL relative to that bifurcation, as in the schema above.
Formally, trl must satisfy two principles:
i. The instant at which the function is defined must be a member of the local
TRL: t ∈ trl(t)
ii. t1 < t2 ∧ t2 ∈ trl(t1)⇒ trl(t1) = trl(t2); that is, if a particular history h is
picked as the TRL of an instant, then all later instants in h also pick it
as their TRL.
10Actually, Belnap and Green consider sentences such as: "Ann will read a novel and she
will not go to the party. It is, however, possible that she will go the party, and then later
she will drink a beer". In the text, we use counterfactuals in order to show the relevance
of Belnap and Green’s objection for Molinism.
11Before Øhrstrøm, a similar solution was proposed by McKim and Davis (1976).
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Local TRLs enable us to solve cases such as Ann’s and to respond to
Belnap and Green’s criticism of the concept of TRL. It is worth noting that,
in this model, there is no unique marked history (the TRL) but a function
defined on elements of the structure. We call this model TRL+.
According to TRL+, the clause for the future is
M, t TRL+ Fϕ ⇔ ∃t′(t′ > t ∧ t′ ∈ trl(t) ∧M, t′  ϕ)
As noted above, the instant at which Ann chooses in a certain way deter-
mines, by definition, a local TRL, which allows to evaluate also with respect
to instants that do not belong to the true future. Local TRLs have raised
some concerns (cf. Belnap and Green 1994 and Belnap, Perloff, Xu 2001).
These criticisms of TRL+ are not of interest here; in demonstrating that Re-
stall’s objection to Molinism is orthogonal to the problems raised by TRL+,
we will show that the issues he raises are common to many other branching
frameworks and are not specific to TRL+. In sketching a solution to Restall’s
objections, we will show that this solution can be adopted by advocates of
both the Aristotelian and the TRL model, confirming that Restall’s question
is not pertinent to Molinism or to the idea of a true future per se.
4 Criticism of the Molinist model
According to Restall (2011), the Molinist needs precisely what the TRL+
model offers. The Molinist maintains that the so-called counterfactuals of
freedom have a truth value; these counterfactuals take the following form:
3. In circumstance C, agent a would have done ϕ.
The truth of counterfactuals of freedom must hold in general.12 For any
circumstance in which an agent makes a free choice, a true future must exist
12The Molinist maintains that counterfactuals of freedom (CF) are eternally known by
God. They are the objects of middle knowledge, in as much as it is intermediate between
the knowledge of eternal and immutable truths and the knowledge of contingent truths.
By knowing the eternal truths and the CFs concerning every possible agent before the
creation of the world, God knows the best world to be created because, for every possible
world, He has foreknowledge of how free agents will behave in that world and of the
outcomes of their actions. Being perfectly good, God can therefore choose the best of all
possible worlds. From the Molinist perspective, it is obviously crucial that the truth of
CFs is compatible with human freedom. The thesis that there is no opposition between
the truth of CFs and human freedom is perfectly characterized by TRL+, as for any choice
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– that is, it must be true that the agent will choose in a certain way, even if
she could have done otherwise. Within the model, this means that, for any
fork (i.e., for any choice), there exists a TRL: a history that the agent, in
that circumstance, will make true. The TRL+ model perfectly accounts for
the truth of counterfactuals such as (3); indeed, the second sentence of (2) is
a counterfactual of freedom.13
Relying on Belnap and Green (1994), Restall (2011) argues against TRL+,
and thus against Molinism, because it does not satisfy the following very
plausible principle14 :
4. p→ HFp
That is, if at a certain moment it is true that p, it also has always been
true in the past that, in the future, it would be true that p. For instance, if
today it is true that Ann is at home reading a novel, then yesterday it was
true that today Ann would be at home. According to Restall:
The failure of this principle is why the thin red line is to be
rejected (. . . ) Why accept this principle? (. . . ) Here, I will
just give one argument to the effect that this principle is valid.
Suppose at point c [a past moment], as I stand looking at my tie
collection, my son Zachary and my spouse Christine are there,
and Zachary says ‘Dad will wear a green tie’ and Christine says,
‘Greg will wear a brown tie’. Then, retrospectively, from the
point of view of g [the actual moment], what Zachary said at c
was correct, and what Christine said was incorrect. (p. 234)
Consider now why principle (4) is not satisfied in TRL+. Looking at
the last picture and, in particular, the instant t3 in history h3. At this pair
instant-history, it is true that p (i.e., that Ann is drinking her beer at the
party). To check whether, in the past, it was always true that Anna would
made by an actual or possible agent, it is already true (before the choice) that the agent
will freely choose in a certain way. For a complete introduction to Molinism, see Flint
(1998). See also Craig (1991), chap. XIII.
13Actually, the Molinist needs a more complex model constituted by many trees. There
are as many trees as there are possible initial states of the world, but we can overlook this
complication here because, for our purposes, the resulting model would not be conceptually
richer than what we are discussing.
14The operator H is the dual of the operator P: Hϕ ≡ ¬P¬ϕ
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drink a beer at the party, we have to go back to the instant t0. At this
instant, is it true that, in some future instant, Ann is going to drink a beer
at the party? The answer is negative. At the instant t0, there exists a true
future (h1), where Ann is at home reading the novel. So, in the past of t3,
it is not true that, in the future, it is true that p. Therefore, principle (4) is
not valid and, given its plausibility, Restall claims that this is a good reason
to refuse both TRL+ and Molinism.
5 A problem for the Aristotelian model too
For the moment, we will not respond to Restall’s criticism. Instead, we
will demonstrate that Restall’s problem affects the Aristotelian indeterminist
model too. Let us consider the following situation.
At t0, the agent was free to choose to go to the party (p) or to remain at
home (¬p). Now, let us evaluate Restall’s principle, at t2,
5. M, t2  ¬p→ HF¬p
Clearly, ¬p holds at t2. Now, if check if HF¬p holds. Accordingly, F¬p
must always be true in the past of t2. So, the point is if M, t0  F¬p
holds. However, as we have seen in the Aristotelian model, the existence of
a history in which p is true entails that F¬p is untrue at t0. This means that
the Aristotelian model shares the same problem as the Molinist model in
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falsifying the plausible principle that if something is true today, it was true
yesterday that it would be true today. The objection does not apply to the
“supervaluational” Aristotelian models which we discuss in the next section.
As a way out, the principle p→ HFp can be made true by adopting the
solution previously outlined: the evaluations must be relativized with respect
to two parameters, where the situation is as follows:
6. M, t2/h2  ¬p→ HF¬p
It is easy to check that things work here; we have that M, t0/h2  F¬p.
However, M, t0/h2  F¬ϕ ⇔ ∃t′(t′ > t0 ∧ t′ ∈ h2 ∧M, t′/h2  ¬ϕ). Clearly,
in history h2 there is an instant at which the agent is at home, and this
suffices to secure the principle’s validity. However, the point is the same as
before; this framework does not capture the intuitive meaning of the future.
On this construal, Restall’s principle should turn out as follows: if p is true
in a history, then it is true in the past of that history that p will be true in
the future of that history. This is surely correct but not very informative.
In conclusion, validating Restall’s principle is a problem for both the
“Molinist” TRL+ framework and for the indeterminist Aristotelian framework
(and, as can readily be shown, for the “pure” TRL system). In a nutshell, the
problem concerns the construal of a possibility that was open in the past but
is now closed. For this reason, to (at least partially) account for Restall’s
intuition, we believe it is necessary to refer to a further element.
6 A possible way out
One can react in a number of ways to the failure of p→ HFp in the branching
time semantics under consideration here. For example, one might argue that
this principle, however intuitive, is not inescapable, and that if abandoning
it is the cost of a branching semantics, then that is a cost worth paying.
Alternatively, one might try to modify the semantics to account for this
principle. In fact, there are some proposals in literature that aim to reform
both the Aristotelian and the TRL model and that validate the principle p→
HFp. As for the Aristotelian model, Thomason (1970, 1984) puts forward
the idea of restricting the valuation at a moment t just to the histories that
pass through t. In other terms, t is the perspective from which propositions
are evaluated (Thomason 1984: 145) Furthermore, the evaluation is in fact
a supervaluation: a proposition ϕ is true a t if it is true in every history
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that pass trough t, false if it is false in every history that pass through t,
indeterminate otherwise. On this view, p → HFp is valid because at any
time t at which p is true, also HFp is, given that the evaluation is restricted
to the histories that pass through t.
As for the TRL model, the proposals of Malpass and Wawer (2012) and
Wawer (2014) make the principle under examination true. The main strat-
egy of these papers is to reject the relativization of the TRL to times and to
keep the original idea of a unique TRL. Clearly, if a formula is evaluated at a
moment belonging to the TRL, then the principle is valid. For the evaluation
to moments external to the TRL, Malpass and Wawer (2012) use Thoma-
son’s method of supervaluations, whereas Wawer (2014) try to rephrasing
the formulas evaluated at moments not belonging to the TRL as modalized
formulas evaluated at moments belonging to the TRL.
So, within both the Aristotelian and the TRL models, it is possible to
make adjustments to make the principle valid.15 Here, we will propose a new
method of accounting for the principle. We believe that this is an interesting
alternative to the models of Thomason, Malpass and Wawer. First, it is a
general method, which is not internal to the Aristotelian or TRL framework,
but can be applied to both. Second, it is able to account for Molinist con-
ditionals of freedom. This is not the case on the alternative models. For
instance, according to Malpass and Wawer (2012), the sentences containing
a future operator, if evaluated at a moment external to TRL, are true iff
some fact obtains in the future of every history radiating from that moment.
Therefore, the sentence "if Ann had gone to the party, she would have drunk
a beer" is true iff Ann drinks a beer in the future of every history passing
through the moment at which Ann is at the party – which is a counterfac-
tual moment, external to the TRL. However, to guarantee Ann’s freedom of
choosing otherwise and not to drink a beer, there should be at least a history
in which Ann does not drink a beer. But, if Ann drinks a beer in some his-
tories that radiate from the moment at which Ann is at the party, and Ann
does not drink a beer in some other histories radiating from that moment,
the proposition F(Ann drinks a beer), evaluated at that point, is deprived of
truth value, according to the model of Malpass and Wawer (2012). However,
if we wish to use the TRL model to account for Molinism and conditionals
of freedom, it is necessary to say that the conditional is true, even thought
Ann does not drink beer in every history. This means that it is necessary
15Thanks to an anonymous referee for emphasizing this point.
15
to keep the TRL+ model, in which the TRL is relativized to instants of time
to make conditionals of freedom true or false. Our proposal has the advan-
tage of justifying the principle p→ HFp within TRL+, i.e. of justifying the
principle within a model in which the conditionals of freedom have a truth
value.
Our framework has no new element.16 However, we believe that the com-
bination of elements it uses is new. It is based on the idea that formulas
are evaluated in a model, at a time t, from a certain perspective or con-
text. The idea of a perspective or context of use circulate in the branching
time semantics in very different forms. We have seen that it is essential in
Thomason (1970, 1984) to account for the principle p → HFp. The model
of Belnap, Perloff, Xu (2001) uses the parameter of the context and that of
Wawer (2012) the context of use. Here we will adopt a notion of perspective
close to that of MacFarlane (2003, 2014). According to MacFarlane, every
proposition must be evaluated at two different times, which he calls context
of assessment and context of use. Also in our proposal the evaluation occurs
at two different times. However, our model differs from that of MacFarlane
for different reasons. One of the most important points is that it allows the
evaluation of formulas at points different from those connected to the per-
spective in order to account for conditionals of freedom. Another substantial
difference is that MacFarlane considers his framework as alternative to that
of the TRL, whereas ours is fully compatible with the TRL model.
Let us take into account the closed formula ϕ. ϕ has a certain truth value
at t. As said above, our semantical framework introduces another ingredient:
we evaluate ϕ at t from the temporal perspective t′ (which, of course, might
coincide with t). Roughly, the idea is to consider the perspective t′ as the
point at which the world is arrived, that is, the present moment.17 We
will use the perspective to prune respectively the histories and the TRLs on
which formulas are evaluated. Let us start to see how this works within the
Aristotelian model.
16We want to thank an anonymous referee for the criticisms and suggestions about our
formal framework.
17Friends of a dynamic and realist metaphysics of time could construe the idea of per-
spective we are presenting in strong sense. However, our semantic allows also an indexical
reading according to which the perspective indicates that instant we consider our ‘now’,
without any metaphysical privilege.
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6.1 Perspective and Aristotelian model
Let Ht = {h|t ∈ h} be the bundle of histories at t, that is, the set of histories
which pass through t. Our model is, then, constituted by the structure BT,
the evaluation function V , and two temporal indices: the instant of evalua-
tion and the perspective from which one evaluates. We sharply distinguish
two kinds of propositions: factual propositions, which concern things that
happen at the present, the past and the future of a given perspective, and
counterfactual propositions, which do not concern what it is happening, hap-
pened or will happen from the given perspective, but what could or could
have happen from another perspective. To give an interpretation to coun-
terfactual propositions is particularly important here because conditionals of
freedom are counterfactual propositions. In this section, we address factual
proposition within the Aristotelian model, in section 6.2, we will deal with
factual propositions within the TRLmodel, section 6.3 concerns counterfacual
propositions in both models.
The evaluations of factual propositions in the Aristotelian model are al-
ways relativized to the intersection of the (bundle of) histories which pass
through the moment of evaluation t and the histories which pass through
the perspective t′. Since we are evaluating factual propositions, we suppose
that this intersection is never empty, that is that the moment of evaluation
is connected with the temporal perspective (i.e. (t > t′)∨ (t′ > t)∨ (t′ = t)).
This seems a reasonable condition because factual propositions concern what
happens at a certain time or in the past or in the possible futures of that
time (the perspective). Because the histories on which we evaluate must pass
through the perspective, certain branches are pruned. Let us see an example:
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In this schema we have four histories; let us suppose we evaluate the
formula ϕ at t, from the perspective t′: M, t, t′  ϕ. So we have the following
truth conditions:
M, t, t′  p ⇔ ∀h ∈ Ht ∩Ht′ , t ∈ V (p)
M, t, t′  ¬ϕ ⇔ ∀h ∈ Ht ∩Ht′ ,M, t, t′ 2 ϕ
M, t, t′  ϕ ∧ ψ ⇔ ∀h ∈ Ht ∩Ht′ ,M, t, t′  ϕ and M, t, t′  ψ
M, t, t′  Pϕ ⇔ ∀h ∈ Ht ∩Ht′ ,∃t′′ < t,M, t′′, t  ϕ
Notice that our evaluation at times and perspectives is analogous to a
standard evaluation as far as evaluations not regarding the future are con-
cerned.18 Things change when we consider the evaluation of future tense.
The idea is, in a nutshell, the following:
18Since in these cases (Ht ∩Ht′) ⊆ Ht, the quantification over the intersection is super-
fluous and it would be sufficient to quantify over the histories in Ht. However, we stick to
this formalization for symmetry with the future case.
18
Here, we have a branching structure in which there are four histories: in
the first two, it is true that ϕ at some times; in the second, it is true that
¬ϕ at other times. Now, let us hypothesize we want evaluate Fϕ at t from
the perspective t. We have, then:
M, t, t  Fϕ ⇔ ∀h ∈ Ht ∩Ht∃t′ > t,M, t′, t  ϕ
Obviously, this does not hold since there exist two histories in the inter-
section on which ¬ϕ is true. But now, let us suppose that the perspective
changes (i.e. time flows) and the schema becomes:
This schema is perfectly similar to the previous except for the perspective
of the evaluation, which is now t′.
19
M, t, t′  Fϕ ⇔ ∀h ∈ Ht′ ∩Ht∃t′′ > t,M, t′′, t′  ϕ
Time flowed – so to speak – and the amount of histories in the intersection
decreased. From the perspective of t′, therefore, ϕ will happen at t. So, for
example, while from the perspective of yesterday, it was not true that Ann
would be at home today, from the perspective of today, when Ann has already
decided to stay at home, it was true yesterday that Ann would stay at home.
So, our framework incorporates MacFarlane’s intuition that the evaluation at
a certain time of a formula containing a future operator changes depending
on the perspective that is assumed.19
Let us see, now, what happens to the crucial principle p→ HFp. Let us
assume to evaluate at t′ from the perspective of t′; we have, then, that
M, t′, t′  p→ HFp
So, let us assume M, t′, t′  p; then, it must be always true in the past
that Fp. Let us consider the instant t previous to t′:
M, t, t′  Fp ⇒ ∀h ∈ Ht′ ∩Ht∃t′′ > t,M, t′′, t′  p
Of course, this holds because p holds in every history that passes through
t′ at a moment subsequent to t. In particular, it holds at t′ itself. Since the
evaluation is always restricted to the histories in the intersection Ht′ ∩Ht, if
p holds at t, then it is true at every moment in the past of t that p will hold
in the future.
The principle p → HFp is valid also in Thomason’s supervalutationist
framework. However, in the framework we present here it is possible to
say that the same utterance is true or false or indeterminate depending on
the perspective from which it is considered. Suppose that yesterday Paul
said: "Ann will stay at home and she will not go to the party". If Ann
is free to stay at home or not and if a supervalutationist semantics of the
future is assumed, it is intuitively true that Paul’s assertion has no truth
value until Ann’s decision to stay at home. But after that decision, this
same assertion acquires a truth value. In our framework, as in MacFarlane’s
relativist framework, it is possible to account for this intuition, whereas in
Thomason’s framework formulas cannot change their truth value at a time
in dependence of a certain perspective.
19When ϕ does not hold in the future of every history of the intersection, we have,
as before, two options: either we can state that Fϕ is false (Peirceanism) or we can use
supervalutations.
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6.2 Perspective and TRL
In this section, we will extend our framework of evaluation at times and
perspectives to TRL-semantics. Our general idea for TRL semantic mirrors
that of the Aristotelian semantics. In the latter case, histories that do not
pass through the moment of evaluation and the perspective are pruned. In
TRL+ case, instead, TRL-histories that do not pass through these two points
are pruned. Recall that in TRL+, for every point of the world there is a local
TRL relative to that point. Then, we suppose that the TRL on which formulas
are to be evaluated must necessarily pass through the moment of evaluation
and the perspective.20 To do this, we introduce an auxiliary notion, that
of a TRL relative, not to an instant of time, but to a segment of the tree,
in particular to the segment that connects the perspective and the time
of evaluation. What is the TRL relative to a certain interval of time? It
seems intuitive to say that it is the TRL relative to the last moment of that
interval. Since the last moment of the interval that connects the perspective
and the moment of evaluation can be either the perspective or the moment
of evaluation, we can define the TRL relative to this interval – which we call
TRL∗ – as follows:
TRL∗(t, t′)⇔
{
TRL(t) if t ≥ t′
TRL(t′) if t′ > t
Now, we have all the elements for defining the semantics of TRL+ in our
framework:
20Recall that the moment of evaluation and the perspective must be connected. It might
be reasonable to introduce further conditions on their relationship. For example, it seems
to be reasonable that the perspective t′ must belong to the TRL of the point of evaluation
t (i.e. t′ ∈ TRL(t)). It would be unnatural if the "present" were not on the TRL of a past
point of evaluation. This is especially true if the perspective is interpreted in a realist and
dynamical sense, as a point that moves on the tree. In this case, if the principle is not
accepted, some counterintuitive consequences follow. For example, it might be the case
that it is true today that Ann will drink a beer tomorrow. Nevertheless, when time flows
and tomorrow becomes the present time, it is false that Ann drinks a beer. However, we
will put aside this matter here. Our aim is to show that the TRL+ model can validate the
principle of retrogradation of truth and the relationships between the perspective and the
moment of evaluation are orthogonal to this problem.
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M, t, t′  p ⇔ t ∈ V (p)
M, t, t′  ¬ϕ ⇔ M, t, t′ 2 ϕ
M, t, t′  ϕ ∧ ψ ⇔ M, t, t′  ϕ and M, t, t′  ψ
M, t, t′  Pϕ ⇔ ∃t′′ < t,M, t′′, t′  ϕ
M, t, t′  Fϕ ⇔ ∃t′′ > t, t′′ ∈ TRL∗(t, t′) and M, t′′, t  ϕ
Obviously, the crucial clause is that regarding the future. Fϕ is true at
an instant and a perspective iff there exists an instant subsequent to the
instant of evaluation that belongs to the TRL relative to the segment t − t′
at which ϕ is true. If the perspective follows the instant of evaluation, then
TRL that must be considered is that relative to the perspective. This implies
that all the TRLs relative to moments previous to the perspective will not be
considered in the evaluation.
If the perspective t′ follows or is equal to the moment of evaluation t or
coincides with it, then the principle p→ HFp is valid. Suppose p is true at t.
Then, the principle is true if at every instant previous to t, Fϕ is true. At each
of these instant t′′, the formula Fϕ is true iff there is an instant subsequent
to t′′ and belonging to TRL∗(t′′, t′) at which p is true. Now, the TRL relative
to the segment t′′ − t′ necessarily pass through t (because t′′ < t < t′) and,
thus, through an instant at which p is true. This validates the principle.
Notice, however, that the principle fails to be valid if the moment of
evaluation follows the perspective. It is easy to see why:
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Suppose, again, that t is the moment of evaluation and t′ the perspective
and that t > t′. Furthermore, suppose that there exists a moment t′′ such
that t > t′′ > t′. If p is true at t, to validate the principle, Fp must be true at
every moment that precedes t. In particular, it must be true at t′′. Now, Fp
is true at t′′, given a perspective t′, if p is true at at least one of the instants
belonging to TRL∗(t′′, t′) that follows t′′. However, since t′′ > t′, the TRL of
the segment t′′− t′ is equal to the TRL of t′′. But it is possible that the TRL
relative to t′′ is different from that relative to t and that in such TRL p is not
true. In such case, Fp would be false, invalidating the principle.
Is the failure of the principle under the condition t > t′ a problem? We
do not believe that to be the case. Restall himself seems to suggest, at least
implicitly, something like this:
[R]etrospectively, from the point of view of g [the actual mo-
ment], what Zachary said at c was correct, and what Christine
said was incorrect. (p. 234)
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The key word is the adverb “retrospectively”; the retrogradation of truth
is an intuitive principle if, say, things happened in a certain way. It is because,
finally, Greg wore the green tie that it is true that it was true that he would
wear the green tie. Our semantics is perfectly capable of characterizing this
state of affairs.
Finally, we introduce the operator . p at a certain moment t means
that p will necessarily happen in the future of t, so that the future of t
is settled with respect to p.21 We suppose that  is sensitive only to the
moment of evaluation and insensitive to the perspective. Formally:
M, t, t′  ϕ ⇔ ∀h ∈ Ht,∃t′′ > t ∧ t′′ ∈ h,M, t′′, t  ϕ
As expected, Fp → p is valid in the Aristotelian framework, but it is
not valid in the TRL+ framework. More interestingly, however, while the
principle p→ HFp is valid in both frameworks (if the point of evaluation is
in the past of the perspective), the principle p → Hp fails to be valid in
either framework. Every point in the past at which ¬p is true at a moment
following that point is sufficient to render the principle invalid. And this
seems reasonable. If Ann has decided to stay at home and not to go to the
party, it has always been true that she would stay at home, but it has not
always been settled that she would stay there: she had a chance to go after
all.
In conclusion, the semantical framework sketched here makes the principle
p → HFp true in certain cases; if Restall’s thesis is that the principle must
be logically valid, then our model clearly fails to satisfy his requirement.
However, it is plausible to construe the principle as concerning what is now
happening and, then, what was retrospectively true that it would happen.
If this interpretation is sound, our framework both preserves the branching
structure of time and makes the principle true in those cases that align with
Restall’s intended meaning.
It follows that our semantics can address Restall’s problem independently
of one’s position in relation to the Thin Red Line; we can admit the existence
of a local true future or we can maintain an Aristotelian position; finally, it
21For similar operators, cf. Belnap, Perlof and Xu (2001), p. 161 and Wawer (2014),
p. 371. Notice that we could also introduce the operator Unsettled, but it would not be
the dual of . The future of t is unsettled or contingent with respect to t iff there are
some histories radiating from t in which it is true at a moment subsequent to t and some
histories radiating from t in which it is false at a moment subsequent to t. Consequently,
p is unsettled iff also ¬p is.
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can be incorporated within Thomason’s supervalutationist framework. In
all cases, our semantics allows the principle Restall wishes to preserve to be
made true without abdicating to branching time.
6.3 Counterfactual cases
Suppose that we wish to evaluate propositions that do not concern the
present, the past or the future of a certain perspective, but what would
happen if things were gone in a different way from they went (from a cer-
tain perspective). Intuitively, things happened in this way, but how ϕ would
have been if, at that time, the events were different? These are, clearly,
counterfactual situations.
Let us hypothesize that the perspective of the evaluation is t′ – in other
terms: that the world “arrived” to t′ – but we want to evaluate a formula at
t. For instance, at t′ Ann is reading a book at home because she decided not
to go the party. But suppose that she had gone to the party, instead. At t
Ann is at the party and she has to decide whether to drink a beer or not.
What would have Ann decided if she had gone to the party?
We will provide here a semantics for some kinds of counterfactuals, the
conditionals of freedom. In particular, our analysis is restricted to historical
counterfactuals (cf. Placek & Müller 2007), i.e. counterfactuals that concern
historical or real possibilities. We further restrict our analysis, within this
particular class, to the counterfactuals that concern the decisions that free
agents would take in some counterfactual situations.
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Roughly, our idea is to shift the original perspective to another, close,
perspective, which represent the time the world would have arrived to, if
things were different. In particular, we would like to know how things go if
the perspective were the counterfactual moment at which Ann is at party.
We need, then, a function that shift the perspective from the actual one to a
counterfactual one in which Ann is at the party, i.e. in which the antecedent
of the counterfactual is true. We can, then, evaluate the consequent of the
counterfactual from that perspective. Formally, we can characterize this intu-
ition by introducing a Counterfactual Perspective Function, fCP , which takes
an instant and yields an “analogous” instant that belongs to an alternative
branch. In other words, the function takes the “present” moment and maps
it on another possible present moment. More particularly22, fCP is a func-
tion that takes two arguments, the present perspective and the antecedent
of the conditional, and gives another perspective as value: this perspective
is a moment at which the antecedent of the conditional is true and which is,
among the moments at which the conditional is true, the moment "closest"
to the present moment.
There are, of course, many ways to account for the closeness or distance
between two moments belonging to different histories. Here is an idea.23
A counterfactual moment t′ is closer to the actual moment t than another
moment t′′, if the history of the world that arrives at t′ is more similar to the
history of the world that arrives at the present moment t than the history of
the world that arrives at the moment t′′. More specifically, suppose that the
histories that contain t and t′ bifurcate at t∗ and the histories that contain
t and t′′ bifurcate at t∗∗. Then, t′ is a closer counterfactual moment than t′′
if the segment t∗ − t′ is more similar to the segment t∗ − t than the segment
t∗∗ − t′′ to the segment t∗∗ − t. We consider the notion of similarity between
two segments of a history as primitive and unanalysed in our framework.
Discussions about the similarity of segments are analogous to the discussions
about similarity of worlds.
22The following interpretation of counterfactuals is inspired by Thomason and Gupta
(1980).
23See Thomason and Gupta (1980), Placek and Müller (2007) and Wawer and Wroński
(2015).
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With this machinery, we are now ready to give the semantics of condi-
tionals and of conditionals of freedom in particular. As for conditional in
general, we propose the following formalization:
M, t, t′  ϕ > ψ ⇔M, fCP (t′, ϕ), fCP (t′, ϕ)  ψ
The function fCP shifts both the moment of evolution and the perspective
to a moment at which the antecedent of the counterfactual, ϕ, is true and
which is the moment closest to t′ among those at which ϕ is true. The
conditional ϕ > ψ is true iff also the consequent, ψ, is also true at this
moment.
Counterfactuals of freedom are a particular case of counterfactuals. Their
general formulation is "If the agent a were in the circumstances C, she would
freely perform the action Z”, that is, these conditionals say what an agent
would freely choose to do, if the antecedent were true.24 For instance, the
counterfactual "If Ann were at the party, she would drink a beer" is true
if 1) Ann had decided to go to the party and 2) if, once at the party, she
freely chose to drink a beer rather than, for instance, a Coke. So we have to
suppose that more than one possibility is open to Ann in the future of the
counterfactual moment at which she is at the party, for instance the possi-
bility of drinking a beer and that of drinking a Coke. More than one history
passes through the counterfactual instant and Ann does different things in
these histories at moments subsequent to the counterfactual moment. So a
counterfactual of freedom has the following structure:
24For an introduction to counterfactuals of freedom, cf. Perszyk (2011).
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M, t, t′  ϕ > Fψ
How to evaluate the formula Fψ depends on the interpretation of the
future that we assume. According to the Aristotelian view, every history that
passes through the counterfactual moment must contain a moment following
the counterfactual moment at which ψ is true. So, if ϕ is true only in some but
not all futures of the counterfactual moment, as required by the libertarian
freedom of the agent, the conditionals of freedom are untrue according to this
view. According to the TRL+ view, instead, the counterfactual of freedom
is true if the local TRL radiating from the counterfactual moment contains
a moment subsequent to the counterfactual moment at which ψ is true. The
two clauses are the following:
I) M, t, t′  ϕ > Fψ ⇔
∀h ∈ HfCP (t′,ϕ) ∩HfCP (t′,ϕ)∃t′′ > fCP (t′, ϕ),M, t′′, fCP (t′, ϕ)  ψ
II) M, t, t′  ϕ > Fψ ⇔
∃t′′ > fCP (t′, ϕ), t′′ ∈ TRL∗(fCP (t′, ϕ), fCP (t′, ϕ)),M, t′′, fCP (t′, ϕ)  ψ
Notice that, since the perspective and the moment of evaluation coincide
at counterfactual moments, the TRL at which the future clause has to be
evaluated is that relative to the counterfactual perspective.
Notice also that the principle p→ HFp is validated also at counterfactual
moments. In other words, if Ann had gone to the party, it would always have
been true that she would go to the party.
Finally, if the antecedent of the conditional if true at the actual perspec-
tive, we believe that the conditional is true if its consequent is also true at
the actual perspective. In this case, the point closest to the perspective at
which the antecedent is true is the perspective itself.25 So, we have to adjust
our semantics of counterfactuals according to the following lines:
1. if M, t, t′  ϕ, then M, t, t′  ϕ > ψ ⇔M, t, t′  ψ
2. if M, t, t′ 2 ϕ, then M, t, t′  ϕ > ψ ⇔M, fCP (t′, ϕ), fCP (t′, ϕ)  ψ
Instead, if the antecedent is not true at any point – it is historically
impossible –, we suppose that the conditional has no truth value: the function
fCP gives no output and the conditional cannot be evaluated.
25So, we accept Lewis (1973)’s view that counterfactuals with true antecendents have a
truth value, even though they are pragmatically infelicitous.
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TRL+ is, then, perfectly apt to make Molinist conditionals of freedom true
or false. If TRL+ modeled the actual structure of the world, God could know
what every free agent would freely choose in every circumstance. Further-
more, TRL+ validates the intuitive principle p→ HFp, when the perspective
follows or coincides with the point of evaluation.
7 Conclusion
In this article, we have analyzed two open future models. In the Aristotelian
model, future-tense propositions lack truth value (or, alternatively, they are
all false). In the TRL model, future-tense propositions are true or false;
however, according to advocates of TRL, this feature does not affect the
openness of the future, as the real future is just one of many alternatives at
agents’ disposal. Restall argues that TRL+ cannot work, as it is unable to
validate the retrogradation of truth: p→ HFp. However, as we have shown
that the Aristotelian model encounters the same problem, this criticism is
not specific to Molinism but also applies to some open future models. We
then sketched a semantical framework within which the truth of propositions
is relativized to the point at which the world has arrived, where the specific
features of TRL+ are preserved but p → HFp is, at least in the relevant
cases, validated. While Molinism can clearly be rejected for many reasons,
we believe that Restall’s criticism is not among them.
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